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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal from a criminal conviction of, inter alia, 
conspiracy and bank fraud, the major issue is whether 
under the Sentencing Guidelines interest owed on a 
defaulted loan obtained by fraud may be included by the 
court in calculating the amount of the victim's loss. A jury 
found that the defendants, a father and his three adult 
sons, had given material and false statements that 
misrepresented their financial resources to two banks in 
order to obtain loans and lines of credit. They defaulted on 
loans from the State Bank of India ("SBI") valued at 
$1,890,702.74, of which $670,718.85 was principal and 
$1,219,983.89 was interest. The district court included 
both the principal and the interest in its calculation of the 
amount of SBI's loss, an integral figure in the 
determination of the defendants' sentences. Raising an 
issue of first impression in this circuit, the defendants 
contend that under the interest amendment in 1992 to the 
Sentencing Guidelines Application Notes, interest on the 
defaulted loan should not have been included in calculating 
the victim's loss. The district court disagreed and also 
rejected the defendants' other claims. We affirm. 
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I. 
 
To obtain loans and lines of credit, defendant Chandra D. 
Sharma ("Chandra") and his sons, defendants Subodh C. 
Sharma ("Subodh"), Sushil C. Sharma ("Sushil"), and Vinod 
C. Vasisth ("Vinod"), made false representations to 
Commerce Bank in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania and SBI in 
New York City. They grossly misrepresented the value and 
profitability of their assets through the submission of false 
financial statements. They gave the banks a false picture of 
their ability to contribute a substantial sum of their own 
money to finance the projects for which they sought loans, 
and of the profitability of their businesses, which could 
purportedly and adequately collateralize the loans. 
 
In 1985, the defendants began planning to build a sixty- 
bed nursing home in the Harrisburg area to be known as 
the Victory Garden Nursing Home ("Victory Garden"). 
Subodh signed a Certificate of Need application prepared by 
an accountant. After two conferences with the Health 
Resources Planning and Development, Inc., both of which 
were attended by Sushil and Subodh, and the latter by 
Chandra, the Pennsylvania Department of Health granted 
the Certificate of Need. 
 
In December 1985, Subodh, Sushil, and Vinod met with 
the architect, Kamal Chaudhury. As a result of that 
meeting, Subodh and Chaudhury negotiated two contracts. 
In the first contract, Victory Garden promised to pay 
Building Technologies, Chaudhury's firm, $5,500 for 
preliminary work and $56,000 for architecture and 
construction. At Subodh's insistence, Chaudhury signed a 
side agreement in which Building Technologies agreed to 
have Eaglemark, the defendants' company, provide on-site 
construction managers for a fee of $19,500. When applying 
for a construction loan with SBI, the defendants submitted 
the primary contract but omitted the Eaglemark side 
agreement from the supporting documentation to the bank. 
 
In December 1985, Subodh signed an agreement to 
purchase fifty acres of land in Duncannon, Pennsylvania 
for $75,000. The land was to be used as the nursing home 
site. In July 1986, Commerce Bank loaned the defendants 
$60,000 for the purchase of the land. Chandra took title to 
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the land solely in his name, but the mortgage on the 
property was in Subodh and Vinod's name. 
 
In June 1986, Chandra, Subodh, and Vinod agreed to 
purchase the Sloan Manufacturing and Engineering 
Company ("Sloan" or "Sloan Manufacturing") for $189,766. 
Vinod and Subodh signed a promissory note for the 
purchase price. The principals of Sloan agreed to accept the 
promissory note for the purchase on the basis of the 
obligor's financial statement. However, it contained a forged 
signature of Sushil's accountants. Subodh and Vinod 
collateralized the note with Eaglemark's assets and 
guaranty; they subsequently defaulted on their note. 
 
Several months later, the four defendants agreed to 
purchase D.B. Industries ("Industries") from Dojcin 
Bulatovic for $175,000. The defendants paid $7,500 down 
and agreed to pay the remaining $167,500 over fifteen 
years with interest at ten percent, evidenced by a 
promissory note confessing judgment and signed by 
Subodh. Seeking a commercial loan for Industries, Subodh 
approached Commerce Bank and submitted a falsified sales 
agreement between Industries and Eaglemark. Most 
significantly, the falsified agreement stated that the 
purchase price was $264,000, rather than $175,000. In 
addition, the agreement stated that the defendants had, 
with the exception of a $50,000 promissory note given to 
Bulatovic, purchased Industries with cash. Commerce Bank 
made the $100,000 loan on the conditions that Industries 
pay off the purported $50,000 promissory note to Bulatovic, 
Subodh pay off a second loan on his residence, and 
Subodh's residence be used as collateral. After Industries 
defaulted on the loan in July 1991, Sushil, seeking to 
modify the loan agreement, presented a statement reporting 
his personal net worth at $1,677,089 and a purported copy 
of his 1990 tax return that overstated his adjusted gross 
income. 
 
In January 1987, Subodh, on behalf of all the 
defendants, sought a $15,000 line of credit from Commerce 
Bank for Perfect Care, another business owned by the 
defendants. In connection with the credit application, each 
of the defendants submitted false personal financial 
statements that failed to list recently-incurred liabilities. In 
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addition, the defendants inflated the profitability and assets 
of their companies, V-Care and Perfect Care. In April 1987, 
Commerce Bank extended the $15,000 line of credit for 
Perfect Care to use as short-term working capital. However, 
the defendants used the money for other purposes. 
 
In June 1987, the defendants obtained a loan from SBI 
for sixty-five percent of the construction costs with a 
maximum of $1,200,000 to finance the building of Victory 
Garden. When applying for the loan, the defendants 
submitted several false documents. Sushil submitted two 
financial statements for V-Care that were signed but not 
prepared by a certified public accountant. These statements 
magnified the company's financial assets. Personal financial 
statements submitted by each defendant failed to list 
recently-incurred liabilities. The construction agreement 
between Victory Garden and G.B. Construction was 
"doctored" to reflect a contract price of $1,600,000, rather 
than the agreed-to $1,200,000. A letter from Sushil 
provided a false explanation for a $2,000 discrepancy 
between the original sales price and the sales price recited 
in the deed submitted to the bank for the land on which 
the defendants planned to build and mortgage the nursing 
home. 
 
Sushil furnished a summary of project costs that 
overstated by at least $340,000 the amount of money the 
defendants had expended on the construction. The 
summary falsely represented that a New York certified 
public accountant had traced disbursements of $589,299 to 
original construction records exclusive of owners' salaries 
and administrative expenses. Based on the summary, SBI 
loaned the defendants $383,044 (65% of $589,299), which 
they transferred to their individual accounts on the day 
following their execution of the construction loan agreement 
with SBI. The defendants then drew checks against their 
respective bank accounts to create the illusion that they 
were personally contributing 35% to the project as required 
by their agreement with the bank. Sushil also submitted to 
the bank a letter from Chaudhury that overstated the 
progress with the construction of the nursing home. 
 
As collateral, the defendants gave SBI a deed forfifteen 
acres of the fifty-acre tract on which the nursing home was 
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to be built. The defendants represented that this land was 
worth $75,000, the purchase price of the entirefifty-acre 
tract. The remaining thirty-five acres were transferred to 
Chandra, who conveyed the property to his wife Heena 
Sharma. Upon discovering these facts, the bank sued in a 
state court, which found the conveyance fraudulent, and 
voided it. SBI ultimately obtained the title to thirty-five-acre 
parcel. 
 
During the construction of Victory Garden, the 
defendants sought additional money from SBI. Again, they 
overstated the extent of their investment in the nursing 
home construction. In February 1988, Vinod filed a 
Corporate Guaranty of Payment of the construction loan by 
V-Care, Inc. Subodh did the same one year later. However, 
V-Care was nonexistent; it ceased to operate in August 
1987. 
 
In June 1988, SBI extended a line of credit of up to 
$258,000 to Sloan Manufacturing. Sloan and a second 
mortgage on the nursing home secured the credit line. In 
April 1989, SBI increased the nursing home construction 
loan from $1,200,000 to $1,850,000. The defendants 
defaulted on the construction loan and line of credit. 
Including the interest due and unpaid at the time of the 
defaults, SBI lost $1,890,702. 
 
Vinod prepared a cost report for Victory Garden to the 
Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare ("DPW") for 
Medicaid cost reimbursement. The report falsely stated that 
Victory Garden had paid Sushil $79,700 in interest. That 
claim inflated the nursing home's Medicaid reimbursement. 
In fact, Victory Garden had not made any interest 
payments to Sushil, and Sushil claimed none on his income 
tax returns. As a result of this false statement, the DPW 
overpaid Victory Garden $63,734. 
 
A grand jury in the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania indicted the defendants in 
December 1996. The indictment charged each defendant 
with conspiracy to: commit bank fraud, make false 
statements, submit a false tax return, engage in money 
laundering, and commit wire fraud (count one). The 
indictment also charged each defendant with bank fraud 
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(counts two and four), making false statements in 
connection with loan applications (counts three andfive), 
and wire fraud (count six). Furthermore, the indictment 
charged Sushil and Vinod with making a false statement to 
a federally-funded state health care program (count seven). 
 
The district court denied the defendants' motion to sever 
count seven from the other counts charged in the indictment.1 
After a three-week trial in September 1997, the trial court 
granted Chandra's motion for judgment of acquittal on 
count six. The jury convicted all defendants of counts one 
through five, Sushil of count six, and Sushil and Vinod of 
count seven. The jury acquitted Subodh and Vinod of count 
six. 
 
The district court sentenced both Chandra and Subodh 
to thirty-three-month aggregate prison terms and Sushil 
and Vinod to aggregate prison terms of thirty-six months. 
The court ordered each defendant to pay $63,734 in 
restitution. All of the defendants timely appealed to this 
court. 
 
II. 
 
A. 
 
The principal issue before us is whether the district court 
properly included the loan interest that the defendants 
failed to pay SBI as part of SBI's actual loss. The resolution 
of this issue affects the length of the defendants' sentences. 
If interest were excluded from the calculation of loss, the 
defendants' total offense level would be eighteen rather 
than twenty, the total offense level the district court 
computed for each defendant. See U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1. The 
defendants contend that the district court erroneously 
included the unpaid interest on SBI's loans in the court's 
calculation of the amount of SBI's loss. The defendants 
emphasize that Application Note 8 to U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1 
excludes interest from the calculation of loss and assert 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court had subject-matter jurisdiction of this action 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3231. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. S 3742(a)(2) and 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
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that the trial court erred in including interest in the 
calculation of loss and disregarded the plain language of 
Application Note 8.2 
 
The district court determined that the exclusion of 
interest in the calculation of loss is only appropriate when 
the interest represents the victim's opportunity cost.3 The 
court concluded that when interest is contractually due on 
a loan, the interest should be included as part of the 
victim's loss. This court has plenary review over the district 
court's interpretation of "loss" in U.S.S.G.S 2F1.1. See 
United States v. Maurello, 76 F.3d 1304, 1308 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
 
For losses of at least $1,500,000 and under $2,500,000, 
the Sentencing Guidelines mandate a twelve-point increase 
in the base offense level. U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1. The pertinent 
portion of Application Note 8 provides that "loss is the value 
of the money, property, or services unlawfully taken; it does 
not, for example, include interest the victim could have 
earned on such funds had the offense not occurred." 
U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1, Application Note 8. Note 8(b) explicates: 
 
       In fraudulent loan application cases and contract 
       procurement cases, the loss is the actual loss to the 
       victim (or if the loss has not yet come about, the 
       expected loss). For example, if a defendant fraudulently 
       obtains a loan by misrepresenting the value of his 
       assets, the loss is the amount of the loan not repaid at 
       the time the offense is discovered, reduced by the 
       amount the lending institution has recovered (or can 
       expect to recover) from any assets pledged to secure 
       the loan. 
 
U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1, Application Note 8(b). Because it does not 
violate the constitution or a federal statute and is not 
inconsistent with the sentencing guideline, Application Note 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Application Note 8 was formerly enumerated Application Note 7. 
Throughout this opinion, we refer to the application note by its current 
designation. 
 
3. We define opportunity cost as interest that a bank could have earned 
had it not made the loan in question. See City of Los Angeles v. 
Department of Transp., 165 F.3d 972, 974 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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8 is authoritative. See Stinson v. United States , 508 U.S. 36, 
38 (1993); United States v. Knobloch, 131 F.3d 366, 372 (3d 
Cir. 1997) ("Courts are required to follow the Application 
Notes to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in imposing 
sentences for federal offenses."). 
 
This court construed the meaning of "loss" in U.S.S.G. 
S 2F1.1 in United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 
1991). We stated that "the fraud guideline defines `loss' 
primarily as the amount of money the victim has actually 
ended up losing at the time of sentencing." Id. at 531. 
Explaining that Application Note 8(b) "plainly states that 
where, as here, the defendant fraudulently misstates his 
assets, the `loss' is the victim's actual loss--unpaid 
principal and interest less the amount the lender has 
recovered (or can expect to recover) from the loan 
collateral," we also concluded that interest on a loan 
procured after the submission of a fraudulent application 
should be included in the calculation of loss. Id. at 535.4 
 
However, the Sentencing Commission subsequently 
amended Application Note 8 to state that the loss"does not 
. . . include interest the victim could have earned on such 
funds had the offense not occurred." See United States 
Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual, App. C, Vol. 1 
(1997) at 279. The Sentencing Commission explained:"This 
amendment clarifies that interest is not included in the 
determination of loss." Id. This circuit has not reviewed the 
viability and perimeters of Kopp in light of the amendment 
to the application note, which became effective on 
November 1, 1992. 
 
Several circuits that have held, despite the amendment to 
Application Note 8, that bargained-for interest due on a 
loan should be included in the calculation of loss. See 
United States v. Nolan, 136 F.3d 265, 273 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 118 S. Ct. 2307 (1998); United States v. Gilberg, 75 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In their reply brief, the defendants contend that the Kopp court 
misread or misquoted Application Note 8(b). Our review of the Kopp 
opinion confirms that this court accurately quoted the application note. 
Allegations that this court misread Application Note 8(b) amount to 
nothing more than a disagreement with our interpretation of the 
application note. 
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F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Allender, 62 
F.3d 909, 917 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Henderson, 
19 F.3d 917, 928-29 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Lowder, 5 F.3d 467, 471 (10th Cir. 1993); cf. United States 
v. Allen, 88 F.3d 765, 771 (9th Cir. 1996) (implying interest 
can be included in calculation of loss). But see United 
States v. Hoyle, 33 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding 
interest not includable in loss calculation and considering 
interest to be excludable time-value of lenders' money lost). 
 
Application Note 8, as amended, which states that the 
valuation of loss does not "include the interest the victim 
could have earned," concerns fraud cases, in which interest 
typically reflects only opportunity cost. The plain language 
of the application note suggests that the Sentencing 
Commission intended to distinguish bargained-for interest 
from opportunity-cost interest. The application note 
excludes from the calculation of loss "interest the victim 
could have earned." U.S.S.G. S 2F1.1, Application Note 8 
(emphasis added). Opportunity-cost interest is interest the 
victim could have earned. In contrast, bargained-for 
interest is an integral part of the borrower's obligation to 
the lender. Such interest is an important, enforceable 
aspect of the contractual agreement and reasonably 
included in the calculation of the bank's loan. If the 
Sentencing Commission had intended to exclude bargained- 
for interest from the loss calculation, it could have used 
appropriate language when drafting the note. Allender, 62 
F.3d at 917. 
 
There is a definitive distinction between interest a debtor 
is contractually required to pay the victim (i.e., bargained- 
for interest) and interest a victim could have earned had it 
invested the money that had been lost as a result of the 
defendant's misconduct (i.e., opportunity-cost interest). See 
id. (holding interest on loan is not opportunity cost and 
includable in calculation of loss); United States v. 
Goodchild, 25 F.3d 55, 65-66 (1st Cir. 1994) (same); 
Lowder, 5 F.3d at 467 (same). The former is a specifically 
defined obligation; the latter is speculative. See Allender, 62 
F.3d at 917. A creditor has a reasonable expectation to 
receive the interest on the loan. See Henderson, 19 F.3d at 
928. After the loan agreement is signed, both the principal 
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and the obligatory interest become the creditor's property. 
See Allender, 62 F.3d at 917. Interest-bearing loans, 
especially mortgage and equipment loans, are an important 
part of a large secondary loan market in this country. We 
read Application Note 8 as requiring the exclusion of 
opportunity-cost interest, but not bargained-for interest, 
from the valuation of the victim's actual loss. 
 
In addition to arguing that Application Note 8's interest 
provision requires the exclusion of the interest owed on the 
loans to SBI, the defendants assert that Application Note 
8(b)'s definition of loss similarly mandates the exclusion of 
interest owed. This subsection note measures the loss as 
"the amount of the loan not repaid at the time the offense 
is discovered, reduced by the amount the lending 
institution has recovered (or can expect to recover) from 
any assets pledged to secure the loan." U.S.S.G.S 2F1.1, 
Application Note 8(b). The defendants maintain that the 
phrase "amount of the loan" clearly refers to the loan's 
principal, but not interest. We disagree. At most,"amount 
of the loan" is ambiguous with respect to whether interest 
should be included in the calculation of the victim's loss. 
The debt incurred by a loan, of course, consists of both 
principal and interest. Although the amount of a loan can 
refer to only the amount of the principal, in banking and 
commercial practice the "amount of the loan" is usually 
construed to include interest due on the loan as well.5 
Accordingly, we hold that in determining the amount of the 
actual loss sustained by the victim in a criminally 
fraudulent loan the sentencing court may include the 
contractually bargained-for interest. Thus, the district court 
did not err when it perceptively included the unpaid 
interest owed in its calculation of SBI's actual loss. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The defendants also claim that Application Note's employment of the 
verb "repaid" further proves that the Sentencing Commission intended to 
include only the loan principal in the calculation of the victim's actual 
loss. This argument is unconvincing. When one repays a loan, one must 
pay both principal and interest. 
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B. 
 
The defendants claim that the district court erred by not 
giving them credit for, and thereby not reducing the 
calculation loss by, the value of assets pledged to SBI that 
SBI recovered or can be expected to recover. They contend 
that they should have received a credit for (1) $455,540.76 
in Victory Garden's accounts receivable due from the DPW, 
in which SBI had a security interest; (2) the assets of 
Industries, which guaranteed the loan to SBI, valued at 
$119,879.00; and (3) twenty-five percent of the value of 
properties in Jaipur, India, in which Chandra, who 
personally guaranteed the loan, had a twenty-five percent 
interest. Further, the defendants claim that the district 
court erroneously gave them a $40,000 credit rather than 
an $80,000 credit for a thirty-five-acre tract of land 
adjacent to Victory Garden that SBI's appraiser valued at 
$80,000. 
 
The district court declined to deduct the $455,540.76 
Victory Garden claimed that DPW owed because the court 
found the alleged debt to be insufficiently documented. The 
court refused to accept the defendants' submittedfigure 
due to their history of falsifying documents. The court 
refused to credit the defendants $119,879.00 for the value 
of Industries and $138,827 for the value of Chandra's 
purported property interest in homes in India because it 
found the evidence of the defendants' ownership of the 
assets to be unclear. The court only credited $40,000 for 
the thirty-five-acre parcel of land because the defendants 
never pledged it as security for the loan. We have plenary 
review over the district court's refusal to give the 
defendants the claimed credits, see Maurello, 76 F.3d at 
1308, but we review the court's factual findings for clear 
error, see, e.g., United States v. Holman, 168 F.3d 655, 660 
(3d Cir. 1999). 
 
Our review of the record reveals that Chief Judge Rambo, 
the trial judge, committed no error in denying, after careful 
consideration, all three of the credits that the defendants 
sought. Her decision to deny the credit for money the DPW 
purportedly owed Victory Garden is essentially a credibility 
determination to which the court is entitled deference. This 
court should not disturb the district court's factual finding 
 
                                13 
  
on appeal except for clear error. Moreover, the DPW's 
preliminary audit showed that Victory Garden owed the 
DPW $311,786.07, rather than the DPW owing Victory 
Garden money. At a minimum, this cast tremendous doubt 
on the defendants' claims that the DPW owed Victory 
Garden $455,540.76, a claim that the DPW strenuously 
denies it owes at all. Furthermore, the collection of this 
debt by Victory Garden is also clouded by the sale of the 
assets in a bankruptcy proceeding in New York. Likewise, 
the judge's decision not to credit the defendants for the 
value of Industries' assets is supported by the evidence. 
There were questions whether the defendants paid 
Bulatovic, who previously owned Industries, in full. Lastly, 
because extended members of the defendants' family were 
challenging Chandra's alleged ownership of the properties 
in Jaipur, India, the court's conclusion not to credit the 
value of the Jaipur properties in the calculation of loss had 
evidentiary and prudential support. 
 
The defendants, however, were entitled to a credit for the 
value of the thirty-five-acre parcel of land located adjacent 
to Victory Garden. SBI's appraiser valued the land at 
$80,000. However, SBI only credited the defendants 
$40,000 toward the loan's principal, and the court likewise 
credited the defendants for $40,000. The district court's 
decision to credit $40,000 rather than $80,000 is not 
supported by the evidence. SBI's own appraiser valued the 
thirty-five acre parcel at $80,000. Because SBI ultimately 
obtained the parcel of land by suit after the defendants' 
default and gave the defendants a partial credit for its 
value, the defendants are entitled to a credit for the full 
value of the land less SBI's expenses in the litigation to 
acquire title. Thus, the court's decision to credit only 
$40,000 is erroneous. Nevertheless, the additional credit to 
which the defendants are entitled for this land would not 
affect any defendant's total offense level under the 
Sentencing Guidelines. Thus, the error is harmless. 
 
C. 
 
The defendants argue that Sushil's wire fraud conviction 
should be reversed because the trial court failed to instruct 
the jury that materiality is an element of the offense. Since 
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the trial of this case, the Supreme Court recently held that 
materiality of falsehood is an element of wire fraud. Neder 
v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1841 
(1999). The Court also held that the failure to instruct the 
jury that materiality is an element of wire fraud is subject 
to harmless error review. Id. at 1833-34. Because Sushil's 
trial counsel requested an instruction that materiality is an 
element of wire fraud, he preserved the issue for appeal. 
Accordingly, although the district court did not have the 
benefit of the Neder decision at the time of the trial, we 
must determine whether the omission of a materiality 
instruction was harmless error. 
 
At trial, the Government alleged that Sushil committed 
wire fraud when in 1991 he sought modifications in the 
terms of a loan on which the defendants were in default. 
Sushil faxed Commerce Bank a copy of an income tax form 
that he purported to have submitted to the IRS. In the tax 
form submitted to the IRS, Sushil reported an adjusted 
gross income of $20,408. The purported copy faxed to 
Commerce Bank recorded an adjusted gross income of 
$102,754. At closing argument, defense counsel claimed 
that the difference in the income tax forms did not affect 
the bank's decision to restructure the loan because (1) the 
two forms stated the same income, (2) the form sent to 
Commerce Bank was accurate, and (3) the difference 
between the two forms, deductions for business losses that 
were taken on the form sent to the IRS but not on the form 
faxed to Commerce Bank, reflected a difference of opinion 
about which reasonable accountants could differ. 
 
We conclude that the difference in the forms was material 
beyond a reasonable doubt because the adjusted gross 
income reported in the two forms differed overwhelmingly. 
The adjusted gross income reported to Commerce Bank was 
five times larger than the adjusted gross income reported to 
the IRS. No reasonable fact finder could conclude that this 
five-fold difference was immaterial. Sushil realized the 
magnitude of the difference; were it not so, he presumably 
would not have submitted to the Bank the form showing 
the substantially greater income. Therefore, we hold that 
the absence of a materiality charge on the wire fraud count, 
of which only Sushil was convicted, was harmless error. 
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D. 
 
The defendants assert that the district court erred by not 
severing the Medicaid fraud count (count seven) from the 
remainder of the indictment. They claim there is no 
commonality between the Medicaid fraud charge and the 
other charges. 
 
We review the district court's denial of the severance 
motion for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Gorecki, 
813 F.2d 40, 42 (3d Cir. 1987). Count one of the indictment 
charged Sushil and Vinod with conspiracy to commit bank 
fraud and wire fraud and to make false statements in 
connection with loan applications and Medicaid 
reimbursement. "As long as the government has charged 
conspiracy in good faith, an allegation of conspiracy is a 
sufficient reason for trying the conspiracy and all 
substantive offenses together." United States v. Smith, 789 
F.2d 196, 206 (3d Cir. 1986). The defendants do not allege 
that the Government charged conspiracy in bad faith. 
Critically important, moreover, is that no defendant moved 
before or at trial to sever the conspiracy count into two 
counts for being multiplicitous. For these reasons, the 
denial of the motion to sever count seven of the indictment 
did not amount to an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 
 
E. 
 
We conclude that the defendants' remaining claims are 
meritless. The district court did not err in denying the Batson6 
claim because the Government had a race-neutral 
explanation for striking an African-American venireperson, 
and Chief Judge Rambo's finding that the explanation 
adequately refuted allegations of discriminatory intent has 
support in the record. Moreover, the defendants failed to 
make a timely challenge prior to the dismissal of the venire. 
They made their challenge after the petit jury had been 
sworn and the rest of the panel dismissed. The defendants' 
claim that the court abused its discretion by giving a willful 
blindness instruction must be rejected because a 
reasonable juror could have inferred from the evidence that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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one defendant may not have known precisely what 
fraudulent act another defendant was committing. The 
instruction ensured that a juror who believed that a 
defendant turned a blind eye toward his co-defendant's 
conduct would not vote to acquit the willfully blind 
defendant. 
 
III. 
 
The district court committed no error warranting reversal 
of any defendant's conviction or sentence. Accordingly, the 
judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
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